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Abstract 
The need to refine, replace and reduce the use of animals in laboratories—the 3Rs concept” —strongly 
influences discussion and regulation of this contested area of technoscience. This special issue looks back 
to the origins of the 3Rs concept through five papers that explore how it is enacted and challenged in 
practice, and that develop critical considerations about its future. Three themes connect the papers in 
this special issue.  These are (1) the multiplicity of roles enacted by those who use and care for animals in 
research; (2) the distribution of “feelings that matter” across species and spaces of laboratory animal 




Introduction: Response-ability in laboratory animal research 
In 2008 Donna Haraway proposed a way of thinking about ethical relations among humans and animal in 
bioscience research laboratories; she eschewed guiding principles in favor of attending to entangled 
subjectivities. Her book opens with a fictional moment when an animal caretaker inserts his arm into a 
cage, to share the suffering of the guinea pigs housed there, inviting the resident flies to bite his arm. 
From this, Haraway proposes the potential of the laboratory as a site of ethical encounter among 
scientists, technicians, and the animals with whom they work. She argues these are not merely places 
where animals are instrumentalized, though this is an undeniable part of their scientific rationale and 
organization; they may also be places from which to acknowledge shared suffering and cultivate respect 
and responsibility. For Haraway, respect is about recognizing both otherness and connection in the 
moment of “looking back, holding in regard, understanding that meeting the look of the other is a 
condition of being oneself” (2008, 88). Response-ability follows from attending to these entanglements of 
science and care, human and animal, subject and object: “to be in response is to recognize co-presence in 
relations of use and therefore to remember that no balance sheet of benefit and cost will suffice” (2008, 
76). Here, Haraway is building from, and responding to, the work of Vinciane Despret (2004), who insists 
on the ethical value of a shared interest in the other. By making the entangled subjectivities of human 
and animal the focus of her empirical studies of scientific encounters, Despret reveals “that learning how 
to address the creatures being studied is not the result of scientiﬁc theoretical understanding, it is the 
condition of this understanding” (Despret, 2004, 131). Animal use and animal care are not separated, but 
connected through capacities to recognize and respond to the suffering of another; what is inadequate in 
this conceptual formulation are the administrative techniques like cost (or more usually harm)/benefit 
analysis in accounting for this ethical relation.  
Haraway’s work has shaped a new set of narratives about animal research, which not only stress the 
processes of instrumentalizing or calculating within animal research, but also show how “people and 
animals in labs are both subjects and objects to each other in ongoing intra-action” (2008, 71). Her work 
on respect and responsibility has helped social scientists study how response-abilities are enacted not 
through “Principles and Ethical Universals but in practices and imaginative politics of the sort that 
rearticulate […] the relations of minds and bodies, in this case critters and their lab people and scientific 
apparatuses” (Haraway 2008, 89). This reformulation provoked debate within critical animal studies 
(Weisberg 2009) and paved the way for ethnographic accounts of the ethical relations and response-able 
practices of laboratory animal husbandry and research. These combine earlier work in STS on the 
material and symbolic transformations of sentient animal bodies into research data (for example, Lynch 
1988; Birke et al. 2007) with a formulation of interspecies intra-action, affective encounter, and ethical 
response-ability (see for example, Greenhough and Roe 2010; Holmberg 2011; Davies 2012a; Friese 2013; 
Dam and Svendsen 2017). They often look at the wider contexts that engender or hinder ethical ways of 
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relating as the growing demands of translational science or increasing positions of scientific precarity 
place animals and researchers in troublesome relations and positions (Davies 2012b; Johnson 2015; 
Nelson 2016). Yet, there remain important questions around how far the practices and politics of 
laboratory animal research, which Haraway’s and other work that has followed articulate, connect with 
other ongoing conversations (particularly within laboratory animal communities) concerning the more 
bureaucratic aspects of science, culture, and care. Here, a different set of “Rs” circulates, shaping the 
political and imaginative spaces in which care, respect and responsibility are practiced. These are the 3Rs 
of replacement, reduction, and refinement of animal research.  
The 3Rs––first systematically articulated in oft-cited but little-read book by Russell and Burch, The 
Principles of Humane Experimental Technique (1959) ––have become fundamental to the definition of 
humane research and improvement of animal welfare within the international laboratory animal research 
community. Together, the 3Rs propose an approach to animal research that prioritizes the replacement 
of animals with alternative mechanisms, where possible; the reduction of the number of animals required 
for a given procedure through statistical or other improvements; and the refinement of experimental 
procedures to minimize suffering and improve animal welfare. The 3Rs have formed the basis for the 
regulation and professionalization of laboratory animal welfare across policy making, animal care and 
housing, experimental protocols, and ethical review, especially in Europe and the UK. The 3Rs now 
provide the core of political commitments to, and social understandings of, ethical animal 
experimentation; they are embedded in national and EU legislation and international guidelines and are 
becoming central to the policies of many organizations that fund and conduct animal research. 
Responsibility was not listed as one of original 3Rs, but the idea of a 4th R of responsibility underpinning 
all the others has been proposed several times in the past (Banks, 1995) and does appear in many 
institutional commitments around animal research1 (see also MacLeod and Hartley 2017).  
This special issue emerged from an initiative to bring humanities and social sciences work on laboratory 
animal science and care into dialogue with the policies and practices of animal research. A small grant 
from the Wellcome Trust brought the authors and other participants together to share previous work and 
explore the future of the 3Rs. This special issue is one of the outputs of this initiative. Further outputs 
included a collaborative agenda-setting article (see Davies et al. 2016), and a larger Wellcome Trust 
funded grant on The Animal Research Nexus led by Davies, Greenhough, Kirk, Hobson-West, and Roe. The 
five papers in this issue trace how the 3Rs and other related bureaucratic activities have transformed 
laboratory animal care. They also respond to the challenge at the end of Haraway’s chapter, where 
Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi probes at the limits of an ethical theory based on co-presence and trans-species 
relationality, asking: “I still want to know how specifically laboratory experimental practices get done and 
                                                             
1 For example at the Max Planck Society https://www.mpg.de/10973438/4rs (accessed 8/11/2017) 
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get justified. These details, these mundane practices, are the place where the politics of successor 
science get worked out” (cited in Haraway 2008, 87). 
This special issue returns to questions in STS around laboratory animal care, paying attention to the 
construction of laboratory animal environments and roles, the distribution of permissions and 
prohibitions, and the combinations of science and care within experimental practices. This foregrounds 
how specific “laboratory experimental practices get done and get justified” and demonstrates how “these 
mundane practices” might shape the contours of a successor science. As the papers demonstrate, the 
scientific and sociological imaginations, which construct the world of experimental animals, already 
embody a complex array of ethical propositions and different political positions, whether in setting limits 
to trading-off harms to animals and human benefits, distributing responsibilities for attending to both 
animal suffering and societal concerns, or shaping the infrastructures for research environments and 
future research trajectories.  
Many of the papers are inspired by Donna Haraway’s approach to understanding responsibility. Yet they 
do so by tracing the practices and enactment of ethics in laboratory and policy environments where 
interspecies relations are already articulated through the imaginative politics of the 3Rs. The 3Rs initially 
sought to weave together good science, good care, and socially acceptable practices of laboratory animal 
research in ways that have been subsequently transformed. In this Introduction, we identify just three 
aspects of this: first, the multiple roles allocated to individuals who use and care for animals in research; 
second, the distribution of feelings that matter across species and spaces; and third, how these are 
related in the growing attention to cultures of care in animal research. Our approach highlights the value 
of creating new interdisciplinary conversations, which combine the concerns of laboratory animal science 
and welfare with insights from social science and humanities research, and generates new sites for 
considering the future of laboratory animal care.  
Newly imagined roles  
The papers collected here are populated by an extensive cast inhabiting the roles now required to enact 
responsibilities across the practices of laboratory animal research. Historical perspectives from Rob Kirk 
and Tone Druglitrø demonstrate the processes through which these roles have been imagined, organized 
across existing infrastructures of animal care and experimental science, and placed within the closely-
related political landscapes of UK and Norwegian debates on animal welfare and animal rights. Beth 
Greenhough and Emma Roe expand understanding of the care practiced by Animal Technologists (or ATs) 
today. They explore how far care for animals, which is mandated by the requirements of the 3Rs, can be 
supplemented by an AT’s emotional engagement with, and day-to-day improvements to, an animal’s 
experience. The roles of the Named Veterinary Surgeon (NVS) and Named Animal Care and Welfare 
Officer (NACWO) are examined in the paper by Pru Hobson-West and Ashley Davies. Their account 
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demonstrates how NVSs and NACWOs reflect on the demands placed on them to consider the complex 
question of animal sentience when making choices about the species of animals used. The dilemmas are 
not resolved through scientific consensus, but by referring to imaginaries of the public via the more 
relational category of social sentience. Carmen Macleod and Sarah Hartley pick up this theme of social 
responsibilities, mapping out some of the ways in which the obligations now networked across laboratory 
animal care might hypothetically be enhanced through the addition of techniques from responsible 
research and innovation (RRI). 
These papers thus all align with perspectives in STS showing how care is material, relational, and 
performative (Mol 2008; Mol, Moser and Pols 2010; de la Bellacasa 2012). However, in addition, in all 
the papers the empirical work shows how personal capacities to care are articulated in and through 
complex encounters––not only with animals and infrastructures, but also with an immense range of legal 
requirements and regulatory guidance. These are increasingly the focus of attention in care and policy 
practices (Gill et al. 2017). What is striking across this set of papers is the range and diversity of roles for 
animal care now named in law and fleshed out in policy guidance, alongside a ubiquitous and not always 
accessible array of acronyms. These require some further introduction. As Druglitrø suggests in her 
paper, the ethical choreography of what Thompson (2013) identifies as “good science” is in part worked 
out through the interlocking movements of some complex bureaucratic activities.  
To embark on breeding, supplying, or using laboratory animals in most parts of the world now requires 
significant administrative knowledge as well as specific biological skills or emotional capacities to care. To 
give one example from the UK: the recently revised Home Office (2014a) Guidance on the operation of 
the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (ASPA) extends to over 160 pages. The Guidance explains 
that you need to be working at a licensed premise, with named individuals in place responsible for 
veterinary care, animal welfare, information, compliance and training, and at an inspected facility, which 
complies with the Home Office (2014b) Code of Practice relevant for holding and using the animals 
located there. This Code of Practice has 220 pages, which spell out in detail the physical facilities and 
accommodation required for different laboratory species. You will need to apply for a personal licence, 
which in turn demands you have completed relevant Home Office Training Modules, themselves 
accredited by the Royal Society of Biology. For procedures resulting in harm equivalent to, or higher than, 
that caused by expert insertion of a hypodermic needle you will also need to apply for a project licence. 
These project licences cover programmes of research for up to five years, and can extend beyond 80 
pages, explaining the purpose, place and plan of research, all experimental protocols, the numbers of 
animals to be used, the severity of procedures, any expected adverse effects, planned endpoints and 
methods of killing, and how you will consider the 3Rs throughout your work. The project licence will be 
reviewed by your local institutional Animal and Welfare Ethical Body (AWERB), considered by the Home 
Office Inspector allocated to your establishment, subject to a harm-benefit analysis, and if approved then 
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implemented with the support of the range of named animal care and welfare staff associated with your 
laboratory and subject to regular inspection.  
The roles allocated to various individuals within these processes are vital for understanding how law 
guides specific experimental practices and caring responsibilities, and how struggles over ethics are 
enmeshed in bureaucratic practices. As Ghamari-Tabrizi suggests in her response to Haraway, the 
“hardest case of all will be struggled over in the actual details of prohibition and license and the details of 
practice in the procedures” (cited in Haraway 2008, 87). These licensing procedures and their implications 
for local practices are often absent from laboratory ethnographies. Perhaps the complexity of this arena 
is as daunting to social science as to science; the latter often now having dedicated individuals or offices 
to deal with the licensing practices required under ASPA. In addition, there appears to be an assumption 
that allocating roles for responsibility is to undermine care. As Noddings warned back in 1984, 
institutionalizing caring according to fixed rules risks that “caring disappears and only its illusion remains” 
(Noddings 1984, p26). 
However, the papers gathered here suggest that something else is going on. This accumulation of textual 
guidance and growing attention to how roles intersect to generate a culture of care is re-opening space 
for engaging the sociological aspects of laboratory animal care in conversation with laboratory animal 
scientists. Here the work of Valverde (2003) in licensing practices in other domains may be valuable. 
Valverde talks about the importance of administrative knowledge in enacting licensing practices (2003, 
20). For Valverde “administrative knowledge” is a hybrid epistemological category, which mixes 
application of “common knowledge” with legal knowledge about what is permitted under law and where. 
Animal research today also requires the mobilization of substantial “administrative knowledge,” but this 
is not simply about having legal knowledge or specialist scientific and animal welfare expertise. As Kirk 
(2017) explains, the formulation and formalization of these roles is preceded by the creation of a shared 
concern for the improvement of animal care. The work of UFAW in the Interwar period is emblematic in 
his argument: even as it exploits the existing divisions between scientific research and animal care to 
reduce scientific concern and political debate, it was critical in generating a “common ground” for the 
professionalization of animal care, and later the “common context” bringing the diverse perspectives 
together around humane experimental techniques that would go on to forge the 3Rs. In this way, 
responsibility becomes “embodied in the very epistemology and practice of science” (Kirk 2017) through 
these newly imagined roles from the outset.  
There remain challenges in how these roles may be supported or undermined as experimental practices 
change and scale up. However, in seeking ways of enhancing care the papers tend to counter sociological 
assertions that the spatial and social divisions of labor simply separate practices of caring from the 
epistemic practices of science (Holmberg 2011), or that the justifications of laboratory animal research 
are completed, a priori, through the humanist underpinnings of cost or harm–benefit analysis. The 
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complex requirements of licensing and other regulatory practices are vital constituents of everyday 
practices of animal research and occupy much of the working lives of individuals across laboratory animal 
research. They are thus a key site for observing care practices and engaging the roles, relations and 
responsibilities associated with them. The energy and painstaking attention that scientists, animal 
technologists, and others must devote to the interpretation and implementation of these regulations 
merits equally careful consideration from social scientists. These papers demonstrate the value of 
attending to these legal and licensing practices, not only as moments of instruction or 
instrumentalization, but also as part of the collective process of forging subject positions in animal 
research.  
Feelings that matter 
If law and licensing practices are important in the creation of responsibilities and subjectivities of 
laboratory animal research, they are also important in the definition of the objects of care, through the 
identification of “feelings that matter” (Webster 2005, cited in Hobson-West and Davies 2017). If care is 
simultaneously a “vital affective state, an ethical obligation and a practical labor” (de la Bellacasa 2012, 
197, cited in Greenhough and Roe 2017), it makes sense to ask how and to whom these affects, 
obligations, and labors are directed. Whilst the previous section explored how roles are distributed 
through the regulatory organization of ethical obligations, here we explore how the papers draw 
attention to feelings that matter across laboratory animal research. Feelings that matter are allocated 
across species and spaces, referring at different points to the feelings of animals and animal care takers, 
as well as those of wider publics. There are different experimental and other practices through which 
these affective states are co-produced and signified. This is perhaps most evident in the foundational 
definition of animal sentience as the requirement for regulatory concern in Hobson-West and Davies 
(2017), which turns out to be co-produced by the NVS through the practices of law, animal welfare 
science, and wider societal sentience. The complexity of this most fundamental recognition points to the 
range of issues at stake elsewhere.  
First, there is the co-production of “feelings that matter” through discussions over animal quality 
(Druglitrø 2017) and the concurrent attempts to define and ameliorate pain, stress, and distress in 
laboratory animals (Kirk 2017). Even today, pain research is a challenging area for the application of the 
3Rs as efforts to understand pain often involve the infliction of pain. In the UK law prohibits pain, 
suffering, distress, and lasting harm that cannot be ameliorated. But there are potential asymmetries in 
patterns of mattering around animal pain, with different motivations for attending to bodily 
manifestations of animal pain (Hobson-West and Davies 2017), and different access to human resources 
to change practices (Greenhough and Roe 2017). Again, the 3Rs manages this tension by aligning good 
science with good welfare, in a move that has enabled the 3Rs principle to travel widely. However, what 
also travels with this is the assumption that a painless death is de facto a “humane” one (Kirk 2017), and 
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within the UK at least, death itself is not considered as a welfare issue under ASPA, even though the 
killing of large numbers of animals that are bred surplus to experimental requirements puts considerable 
stress on animal technologists (Greenhough and Roe 2017).  
Secondly, the recognition of stress as a feeling that matters, which may have implications for 
experimental results (Druglitrø 2017; see also Kirk 2014; Davies 2012b), also has potential impacts on the 
organization of laboratory animal research more broadly. As laboratory animals increased in “quality” 
and thus in value, the importance of the care outside of experimental spaces, and thus feelings that 
matter, extend into wider networks of animal breeding and supply. Recognizing the importance of animal 
stress––for the animal, for the experiment, and for the experimenter––can be used to extend the 
importance of animal welfare from the point of procedure to the whole animal life course, on the basis 
that it doesn’t matter to animals where their suffering or stress comes from. The trans-species 
relationality of laboratory animal research that Haraway places at the moment of encounter, reaches 
back in time and outwards through space, with implications for care practices and the care of caretakers. 
For Russell and Burch, these questions of animal welfare were thus also necessarily ones of “human 
sociology; for they are determined by human needs and decisions” (Russell and Burch 1959, 32, cited in 
Kirk 2017). The nature of these human needs and decisions may be questionable and changeable, but 
attending to trans-species relationality becomes more, not less, important as the lifetime experiences of 
animals are bought into consideration.  
The final point about feelings that matter relates to the growing recognition of societal concerns around 
animal research, and the identification of public stakes in responsible regulation more broadly (MacLeod 
and Hartley 2017). This aspect is not explicit in the work of Russell and Burch. Whilst their arguments may 
have presupposed a shared culture, as Kirk explains, there is “no consideration whatsoever as to the view 
and concerns of the lay public” (Kirk 2017). There has been a subsequent shift in who is now required to 
consider the concerns of the public and the ways and places through which this is performed. This is a key 
issue in many of the papers, but most notably in that by Hobson-West and Davies. Reducing the societal 
“pain, suffering, distress, and lasting harm” that is a potential consequence of laboratory animal science 
emerges as an implicit ordering principle in decisions made by named vets and NACWOs about animal 
sentience. The explicit requirement to accord importance to societal concerns about animal research is 
increasingly embodied in law and local practices, such as lay membership of ethical review boards.  
Changing cultures of laboratory animal research 
The most notable recent change in the international language of animal research regulation has been the 
increasing attention to the development and support of local cultures of care within establishments and 
facilities. Yet to return to questions of culture is something of a challenge to contemporary science and 
technology studies. Here analytical approaches have actively moved away from “reducing events and 
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actors to a given context” (Asdal 2012, 379) and the use of a category of culture, towards attending to 
more tangible forms of material relationality or more affective qualities of atmospheres. It is telling that 
none of the papers use culture as an explanatory category, except in Kirk’s identification of a now 
obsolete shared culture of science and humanities. Yet, this growth in culture as an actor’s category 
demands serious attention, and several of the papers begin this process. In part, this growing discussion 
of the culture of care within an establishment reflects the local proliferation of named roles allocated to 
individuals responsible for different aspects of animal welfare. To identify how far they work together to 
create a good culture of care requires practical attention to how these roles interact and communicate 
with one another and the often palpable but more incalculable atmospheres of care that they create. In 
part it also reflects a growing discussion about the international regulation of animal research 
(MacArthur Clark 2008; Turner et al. 2015), which may include harmonizing regulations across different 
spaces and recognizing different national relationships between societal expectations of animal research 
and local regulation of care. A culture of care is thus a complex relational and spatial category from the 
outset.  
In the UK context, the recent definition of a culture of care emphasizes the character of local 
establishments, wider societal expectations and the interplay of local and national governance: “A good 
culture of care is an environment which is informed by societal expectations of respectful and humane 
attitudes towards animals used in research. Each establishment will have its own way of conveying its 
culture of care. However, all establishments are subject to similar governance and legal responsibilities 
under ASPA to deliver humane care” (Home Office 2015). As Greenhough and Roe explain, having a good 
culture of care is often about exceeding what is mandated by law. It is an ongoing process of relating, 
within an establishment, which needs to be cultivated and sustained. It may be enhanced or hindered by 
technological and organization change, but it indicates an aspiration, such that a culture of care is 
expected to exceed a culture of compliance.  
However, this is not a universal definition or experience. It may vary across different establishments and 
different national contexts. As Friese and Nuyts’s commentary and bibliometric analysis underscores, 
culture shapes the ways in which the ethical frameworks of the 3Rs are transformed as they travel. Again, 
a precursor to these more cultural questions of laboratory animal care can be found in the closing 
chapter of Russell and Burch’s 1959 book. This focuses on the psychological, sociological, and 
organizational factors influencing the adoption of “existing knowledge to the improvement of 
experimentation” (1959, 164). The logics operating within different research, pathology, and commercial 
laboratories are explained with reference to the ecologies of these settings; the different incentives for 
replacement, reduction and refinement in animal research are found in the flows of time, cost, and effort 
across each system. Those aspects of individual psychology, institutional rigidity, or legal constraint that 
prevent communication and change are understood through the maintenance of habit, ultimately leading 
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to inertia, isolation, and extinction. The languages that Russell and Burch used in 1959 have changed but 
the interdisciplinary challenge they identified still endures: how to understand the ways in which 
situations influence the application of knowledge to the improvement of experimentation and laboratory 
animal care?  
Understanding the cultures of laboratory animal research is not only of value in considering how local 
establishment cultures may hinder or enact change. There are also interdependencies with the wider 
cultural relations between science and society. As Germain et al. conclude in their review of changing 
European politics of animal experimentation, what is at stake in this debate is as much about the way the 
“place of science in society is articulated and scrutinized […] in the public sphere” (Germain et al. 2017, 
76). A telling contrast emerges in the way a culture of care is currently being used outside of Europe. In a 
policy and practitioner focused paper, Klein and Bayne (2007) discuss their aspiration for “establishing a 
culture of care, conscience, and responsibility” in the USA. In their introduction, they quote Dr Alan C. 
Rosenquist, the Chair of the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee 
(IACUC), who stated, “Let's regulate ourselves or someone with a ‘.gov’ address will do it for us” (2007, 
3). They explain: “one strategy to prevent burdensome regulations is the development and 
implementation of a comprehensive program of animal care and use” (2007, 3). Here, a culture of care is 
counterpoised to a culture of control.  
This difference in national political culture matters, not only for local practices of animal welfare, but also 
in the search for theoretical resources and social scientific accounts of the places in which responsibility is 
enacted in laboratory ethnographies. Haraway’s focus on the inter-corporeality of co-presence and the 
capacities of local researchers as the basis for trans-species responsibilities may be effectively aligned 
with the local institutional structures of animal regulation in the USA, and sometimes elsewhere. 
However, in Europe and the UK, the cultural landscapes of care are different, in part due to the 
institutional dialogue that the development and implementation of national and international regulation 
has instigated. Kirk suggests that originally, the “3Rs were never intended to be institutionalized […] they 
were to be internalized: embodied in the human scientist and enacted in scientific research” (2017). The 
papers here indicate that they are both partially institutionalized and internalized, and that there remain 
gaps and tensions. However, they also demonstrate how this innovation in the identification and 
governance of humane research has formed a rich set of resources for future institutional practices and 
individual conversations about animal research and animal care. These do not exhaust the conversations 
to be had about interspecies intra-action, affective encounter, and ethical response-ability. However, 
they arguably have the potential to exceed the emphasis on identifying responsibility only through animal 
encounters, notably through the incorporation of efforts to reduce and ultimately replace animals in this 
ethical formulation from the outset.  
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Conclusion: Sharing responsibilities for a successor science 
 
The papers assembled here explore how the regulation of animal research, especially in the EU but 
increasingly elsewhere, is both facilitated and shaped through a raft of regulations, principles, 
handbooks, guidelines, standards, and norms for humane laboratory animal care. The way these 
construct notions of respect and responsibility have been developed and adapted over time, and 
increasingly include new demands for responsibility to societal concerns. The contexts in which they have 
been developed and subsequently implemented reflect a range of values around human-animal relations, 
but also the other interfaces between the humanities and sciences, and the patterns of accountability 
between science and society. We present them here as part of our efforts to open space for collaborative 
research across interdisciplinary and practitioner perspectives in laboratory animal research and testing. 
As Ghamari-Tabrizi implies “these details, these mundane practices, are the place where the politics of 
successor science get worked out” (cited in Haraway 2008, 86-87).  
The importance of this beyond the laboratory animal community point is underscored in Asdal’s 
commentary, where she argues that to understand change requires “attending to how entities, 
collectives or assembles are modified and transformed, over time, by way of little tools, such as, for 
instance law, principles and rules.” We welcome this growing attentiveness to the liveliness of guidelines 
and handbooks, cultures of care, and licensing practices, which are as central to the imaginative politics 
of animal research and use as trans-species relations. In responding to Asdal’s questions about “interest” 
(2017), we are interested in how this special issue can contribute to conversations seeking to move 
beyond critique and explore how to enact more responsible practices in science (Thompson 2013). We 
also find interesting the current dialogue between histories of science and science and technology studies 
(Daston 2009; see also Druglitrø 2016) and how, in this case, attending to changing framings around 
science in the past has the potential to inform and take us beyond forms of relating in the present. 
Overall, we suggest that the history of the development of humane techniques in animal research 
demonstrate how debates about humanism, and its alternatives, are always already complexly involved 
in enacting situations.  
Collaboration among the humanities, social sciences and sciences may further laboratory animal science 
and welfare, and so there is value in going back to recover the interdisciplinary basis of Russell and 
Burch’s 1959 volume. However, this also uncovers warnings. As Kirk identifies, the book had as its origins 
an “earlier ethos wherein humanistic and scientific values occupied a shared culture” (Kirk 2017). Yet 
even at its publication, its eclectic, multi-disciplinary style limited its ability to travel, and its mix of 
cybernetics and psychoanalysis has “little traction today” (Kirk 2017). Whilst interdisciplinary 
conjunctions can be productive, speaking across disciplines and communities can be challenging (see 
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Davies et al 2016). Debates in the UK, Europe and USA have focused attention more firmly on questions 
of experimental reproducibility and replicability, as well as animal model relevance (see for example AMS 
2015; Würbel 2017; Garner et al. 2017). These are part of a greater focus on the translation of animal 
research into health and clinical outcomes, but they also reflect related moves towards open science and 
data sharing, and an increasingly critical attention to research integrity and reproducibility.  
The contexts in action for laboratory animal science (Asdal 2012) thus both differ broadly and reach 
deeply into the practices of animal care. As Kirk puts it, “the wider social, cultural and political context 
surrounding the scientific use of animals should then be seen as integral to the transformation of animal 
care and experimental practices over time. This historical process might best be seen as the animal 
research nexus” (Kirk 2017). This nexus of relational historical processes in which new subject positions 
are imagined, feelings that matter are co-produced and cultures of care transformed connect Haraway’s 
emphasis on sharing suffering in the laboratory with the locally situated but also extended 
responsibilities for animal care. We hope this collection will inspire further exploration of potential for 
shared responsibilities through the intersections of the experimental protocols and bureaucratic activities 
of laboratory animal science and welfare. Nearly 60 years after the publication of Russell and Burch, we 
see an urgent need for new, collaborative research that uses the humanities and social sciences to fully 
explore the dynamics of the animal research nexus today.  
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